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Negotiated: 2002.
Signed: 24 May 2002 in Moscow.
Ratification: United States 6 March 2003;
Russia 7 June 2003.
Entered into force: 7 June 2003.
History. The United States and the Soviet
Union agreed in 1990 that another round of negotiations on
strategic weapons, START II, would follow the conclusion of
START I, signed in June 1991 {1.6.90}. In the autumn of 1991,
Bush and Gorbachev agreed to set up two delegations to negotiate
START II reductions. These groups met in November 1991. The
breakup of the Soviet Union interrupted the negotiations {20.11.91}.
At the end of January 1992, Yeltsin proposed a reduction to
2000-2500 warheads each, while Bush proposed a cut to 4700
each. A series of meetings between Secretary of State Baker
and Minister of Foreign Affairs Kozyrev produced a “joint
understanding” at the 16–18 June 1992 Bush-Yeltsin
meeting in Washington. Russia agreed to eliminate all MIRVed
ICBMs in return for US elimination of half of its SLBMs, a
cut to 3000–3500 total warheads on each side, and an
extension of the period for elimination to 2003 (or 2000 if
the United States provided financial assistance to for dismantling
and destruction).
The two sides expected to translate this understanding into
a treaty in a few months. Russia, however, suggested some
changes in the joint understanding and in START I provisions
— changes that would have reduced the costs for Russia
in moving to a smaller strategic nuclear force. Through the
summer and autumn of 1992, the two sides negotiated on these
changes. In December 1992, the USA made some concessions which
let the two sides reach agreement on SS-18 silos, SS-19 downloading,
and re-orienting bombers from nuclear to non-nuclear capabilities.
On 3 January 1993, Bush and Yeltsin signed the START II Treaty
in Moscow, agreeing to reduce the US and Russian nuclear arsenals
to 3000–3500 strategic warheads. On 15 January, Bush
sent the Treaty to the US Senate, and on 9 February Yeltsin
sent it to the Russian Duma. Subsequent political difficulties
delayed ratification in the United States until 1996 and in
Russia until 2000, when the Duma’s approval made entry
into force contingent on US ratification of several further
protocols reached in 1997.
At a March 1997 Helsinki summit, presidents Clinton and Yeltsin
agreed to begin negotiating START III, with the goal of bringing
each side down to 2000–2500 warheads by 31 December
2007. They also agreed that START III would contain measures
on transparency of warhead inventories, the destruction of
strategic nuclear warheads, and the permanence of START I
and II. A Russian letter on early deactivation, signed with
the other September 1997 START II documents, contained a unilateral
statement that it expected START III to enter into force before
January 2004 {26.9.97}. In September 1997, Russian Foreign
Minister Primakov also said that Russia would like to discuss
even lower caps than those specified at Helsinki. In December
1997, Yeltsin announced that Russia would reduce its nuclear
arsenal by “another third.” According to Yeltsin’s
press secretary, the announcement was a “possible proposal
on START III.”
The announcement reportedly prompted preliminary consultations
on START III. The United States set up an interagency review
group tasked with determining its START III force posture.
Options considered included removing four out of 24 missile
tubes from Trident submarines and de-MIRVing SLBMs. In a report
to Congress, the administration said that it was considering
options for START III, but had made no decision {23.4.98}.
US-Russian bilateral talks on START III and the ABM treaty
began in June 1999 and continued throughout the year without
any concrete progress {20.6, 17-19.8, 8-9.9, 18.9, 21-22.10,
22.12}. The United States tried to persuade Russia to agree
to a trade-off between more affordable cutbacks in arsenals
under START III, which Russia wanted for financial reasons,
and a modified ABM Treaty which would allow the United States
to deploy a limited national missile defense (NMD). Some Russian
experts felt, however, that it might be better for Russia
to pursue new MIRVed missiles and keep existing SS-18s —
in violation of START II provisions — than to accept
the US proposal {30.10, ACR 614cST3 10.99}. Given continuing
disagreement over the ABM treaty and US NMD plans, the US
Defense Department began to consider START III options that
would permit limited Russian deployment of a new Topol-M ICBM
with a MIRVed three-warhead configuration {21.1.99; 20.10.99}.
Russian offer. On 13 November 2000, President
Putin announced that his earlier offer to go down to 1500
strategic warheads was not a final limit, and that his government
was ready to consider even lower limits. He tied this offer
to continued acceptance and observation of the ABM Treaty.
Putin’s proposal comprised the following points:
- Intensify the disarmament process;
- Limit strategic nuclear arsenals to
1500 warheads by 2008;
- Negotiate further reductions to begin
after 2008;
- Reinforce and build on the legal mechanisms
of START I and II;
- Ratify the 1997 START II and the ABM
protocols in the US Senate;
- Move “in parallel” to
radically reduce nuclear munitions;
- Strengthen and preserve the ABM Treaty;
- Propose an alternative to NMD; and
- Discuss the ABM Treaty in the Standing
Consultative Commission.
On 2 July 2001, Putin repeated his offer
for mutual cuts in US and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals
down to 1500 warheads {2.7}.
In January 2003 the Russian State Duma revised a bill for the
ratification of SORT, and approved it on 10 February. In March
the US Senate also approved ratification of the treaty, although
many senators, Democrats and Republicans alike, expressed reservations
about the lack of details provided in SORT. On 14 May 2003,
the State Duma ratified SORT by a 294-134 vote with 22 abstentions.
The Law on Ratification of the Strategic Offensive Reductions
Treaty as amended by the State Duma includes several caveats:
the Federal government must provide information and on work
to deploy antiballistic missile systems in other states and
on possible threats to Russian security if other countries undertake
to put nuclear weapons in outer space.. The law also reserves
the right of the State Duma and the Federation Council to take
part in deciding the allocation of annual funds for research
on and purchase of strategic armaments. In addition, the law
specifies conditions for withdrawal from SORT— namely,
if situations arise that threaten the “supreme interests
of the Russian Federation,” such as a violation of the
treaty by another party or the deployment of antiballistic missile
systems by another state or group of states in a manner that
could profoundly affect the capabilities of Russia’s strategic
nuclear forces. On 7 June President Putin signed the SORT ratification
bill into law, bringing the treaty into force. {ACR 617bSRT03
14.5; 7.6}
In October 2004, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced
that in the near future Russia would have arms capable of surmounting
all current ABM systems. Putin noted that the new technology
was not aimed at the USA, and that his country fully intended
to comply with SORT obligations by 2012.
{ACR 617bSRT04 27.10}
US position. As a presidential candidate, George
Bush declared his intention to affect deep cuts in the number
of US nuclear warheads. On 1 May 2001, President Bush announced
his willingness “to move quickly” to reduce the
US nuclear arsenal to “the lowest possible number”
{1.5.01}.
US-Russian differences over the future of the ABM Treaty and
US missile defense plans dominated US-Russian talks for most
of 2001. Several rounds of talks at various levels, including
meetings at the presidential level, failed to resolve these
differences. The Russian decision to accept the US withdrawal
from the ABM Treaty in late 2001 (see ACR 603bABM01) finally
cleared the way for the commencement of formal negotiations
on a US-Russian agreement on strategic nuclear arms reductions.
At a 2001 summit meeting with President Putin, President Bush
announced that the United States was willing to reduce its operationally
deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 1700 and 2200
by 2012. President Bush expressed a preference for storing rather
than destroying a significant number of the surplus warheads
and for an arrangement well short of a formal arms control treaty.
Russia insisted that the two sides destroy their surplus warheads
and formalize the arrangement in a legally binding treaty. In
December 2001, the USA and Russia agreed to begin talks on these
issues in January 2002.
Negotiations in early 2002 focused on the Russian demands —
destruction of surplus warheads and a formal, legally binding,
treaty. The two sides eventually agreed to a legally binding
treaty that did not provide for destruction of surplus warheads.
In a marked departure from earlier strategic nuclear arms control
agreements, the new treaty did not provide for elimination of
any weapons, nor did it contain any verification mechanism.
Presidents Bush and Putin signed the treaty in Moscow on 24
May 2002. The United States ratified the treaty on 6 March 2003,
and President Bush welcomed the approval of SORT by stating
that the treaty helped lay to rest the legacies of Cold War
competition and suspicion. {ACR 617bST302 24.5; 617bSRT03 6.3.03}
In January-March 2004 the USA and Russia engaged in talks concerning
the implementation of SORT. Though the talks and work were described
as useful and a draft document was drawn up setting forth the
tasks of a bilateral committee for the implementation of the
treaty, this committee met only twice in 2004. The USA expressed
concerns over how Russia intended to count its weapons reductions
under the treaty because SORT did not have a verification clause.
{ACR 617bSRT04 29.1; 12.2; 31.3}
Title. The formal title is above. Informally,
the treaty has been called the Moscow Treaty or SORT. The Reporter
informally refers to treaty as SORT.
Weapons. Unlike START I and II, SORT places
a ceiling of 1700–2200 on the operationally deployed warheads
of each side, not on total strategic warheads.
Reductions. The treaty does not stipulate a
timeline for reductions. It provides for the limits on operationally
deployed warheads to be reach by the end of 2012, which is also
the deadline for the duration of the treaty.
Implementation. The newly created Bilateral
Implementation Commission will meet at least twice a year.
KEY ELEMENTS OF THE
SORT TREATY
The operative part of the treaty
is as follows:
Article I
Each Party shall reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads,
as stated by the President of the United States of America on
November 13, 2001 and as stated by the President of the Russian
Federation on November 13, 2001 and December 13, 2001 respectively,
so that by December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of such warheads
does not exceed 1700-2200 for each Party. Each Party shall determine
for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive
arms, based on the established aggregate limit for the number
of such warheads
Article II
The Parties agree that the START Treaty remains in force in
accordance with its terms.
Article III
For purposes of implementing this Treaty, the Parties shall
hold meetings at least twice a year of a Bilateral Implementation
Commission.
Article IV
1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance
with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty
shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments
of ratification.
2. This Treaty shall remain in force until December 31, 2012
and may be extended by agreement of the Parties or superseded
earlier by a subsequent agreement.
3. Each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may withdraw
from this Treaty upon three months written notice to the other
Party.
Article V
This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the
Charter of the United Nations.
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Nuclear Treaties