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25th Anniversary

Nuclear Proliferation

Middle East: Israel, Iran

South Asia: India, Pakistan

NE Asia: DPRK, ROC, Japan

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Missile Proliferation

 

GLOBAL CONTROL SYSTEM

In a speech at the G-8 1999 summit in Cologne, Germany, Russian President Yeltsin proposed a global control system for ballistic missiles that would be open to all states {20.6}. In 2000, Russia held an international conference to advance this proposal. Russian officials clarified that the system could include advance notification and global monitoring of missile launches as well as security guarantees for states that give up missiles capable of delivering WMD. {16.3}. Russia held another conference on the topic in 2001 {15.2}.

POSITIONS OF GOVERNMENTS


Argentina agreed not to produce nuclear-capable missiles {28.11.90} and dismantled its Condor-2 program by shipping completed missile components to Spain for destruction {box 3.3.93; box 28.9.93}. Argentina participated in its first MTCR plenary in 1993. {29.11–2.12.93}

Along with Argentina, Brazil agreed to ban production of missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads {28.11.90}. Brazil joined the MTCR in 1995. {10–12.10.95}

China. In 1991 and 1993, the United States imposed limited sanctions on China for selling M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan {27.5.91; 25.8.93}. In 1994, China officially agreed to observe the MTCR guidelines and not export missiles that were “inherently capable” of exceeding the MTCR parameters. In exchange, the United States lifted sanctions against China. {4.10}
China apparently transferred missile components to Pakistan after the agreement was reached, however, and continued to aid the missile programs of Iran, Libya, and North Korea. In 2000, responding to intense US pressure, China agreed not to help other states develop nuclear-capable missiles, thus warding off new US sanctions {21.11}. In 2001, following reports of continued Chinese missile exports to Pakistan, the United States imposed sanctions on the Chinese companies involved in the exports {6.8, 1.9}. The United States and China failed to resolve their differences over China’s missile exports at a summit meeting {19.10}, but continued to discuss the issue {29–30.11}. In 2002 the United States imposed sanctions as a result of Chinese missile-related exports to Iran {9.5}. The USA sanctioned the state-owned China North Industries Corp., also known as Norinco, for selling ballistic missile parts to an Iranian company, and also sanctioned China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC), a unit of the China Aerospace Corporation, over allegations of missile technology proliferation to an unknown nation {706bMNP03 9.5, 31.7}. China offered an export control seminar in late 2003 to educate firms and individuals on the new missile-related export regulations, though Chinese entities continued to work with Pakistan and Iran on ballistic missile related projects in the same period {24.11.04}. In late 2004, the USA sanctioned seven firms for transferring weapons or missile technology to Iran {27.9}.

The United States has been trying since 1998, so far unsuccessfully, to persuade China to join the MTCR {5.10.00}; but China did announce new export control regulations covering missiles in 2002 {25.8}. In early 2004 the MTCR chairman met with a Chinese representative to compare their export of missile and related items legislation with the MTCR Annex, in order to enhance understanding of existing differences {10-11.2}. A second round of talks on export control law enforcement measures led to speculation of China joining the MTCR {3.6}. China enacted new laws and regulations to form a more complete missile technology and related materials export control system {21.7}.
In 2004 the new 1500 km Donghai-10 cruise missile was tested with a 10 m precision strike capability {21.9}. US President Bush asked China to use restraint and prudence with regard to its expanding ballistic missile buildup, particularly those missiles aimed at Taiwan {26.11}.

India experienced problems because of the MTCR restrictions {14.10.91}. In the early 1990s, the Indian Space Research Organization and the Russian agency Glavkosmos were subjected to US sanctions for the Russian sale of cryogenic rocket engines and technology to India. In 1997, the United States placed export curbs on some Indian firms for their role in India’s missile program. {2.6.97} In December 2003, the USA lifted its ban on technology sales to India that included missile and space defense items. In 2004 US and India announced deeper cooperation on civilian nuclear and space programs, and high technology trade, epitomized by the US removal of its ban of technology exports to the DRDO. India also held separate talks with Russia and Israel concerning joint development of long-range missiles {706e1MNP04 12.1, 3.3, 31.8, 20.9}.

In 1997, India officially announced the beginning of serial production of the army’s version of the short-range liquid-fuel Prithvi missile {box 15.9.97}. It has continued work on the air force and naval versions of the Prithvi. The Prithvi missile was tested in March 2003, and a modified Prithvi SSBM was tested in April. In September Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee announced that India [had produced or would produce or was in the process of producing] 30 new Prithvi missiles with a solid propellant motor replacing the previously-used liquid-fuel motor. {706bMNP03 2.9} In 2004, the 150-300 km Prithvi missile was successfully tested twice, as well as the 250-300 km Prithvi III and the Dhanash naval variant missiles {706e1MNP04 23.1, 19.3, 27.10, 7.11}.

In 2001, India tested the intermediate-range liquid-fueled Agni I and solid-fueled Agni II. The same year India began “limited production” of Agni II missiles and authorized the creation of an Agni nuclear missile group {706e1MNP01 31.5, 19.11}. In 2002, India test-fired a solid-fueled Agni I to a range of 700 km {706e1MNP02 25.1}. In 2003, the Agni-I was tested again as part of a plan to develop missiles that could be fired from rail- and road-mobile launchers to ensure “survivability and deterrence.” {706bMNP03 9.1} In 2004, the Agni-I and Agni-II were successfully tested {706e1MNP04 4.7, 29.8}

In 2002 India began marketing the Brahmos cruise missile jointly developed with Russia. {706bMNP02 20.2} The Brahmos missile was tested at least six times from land or ship in 2003. Production and assembly of the Brahmos commenced in 2004. An air-to-ground version of the Brahmos will enter trials on Su-30 flights in 2004. In April 2004, the Brahmos venture began global marketing. The missile was tested twice, once from a mobile launcher, and the other from an INS Rajput {706e1MNP04 13.6, 3.11}.

Iran. According to the CIA, Iran acquired from North Korea some 100 Scud-Bs in 1987–88 and an unknown number of Scud-Cs after 1991. In 1998 and 2000, Iran test-fired the 1300 km-range Shahab-3, reportedly a variant of the North Korean No-Dong. A third flight test of the Shahab-3 in 2000 failed {706e4MNP00 21.9}. Iran was also reported to be working on a longer-range Shahab-4 missile. Iran tested the short-range Fateh missile in 2001 {706e4MNP01 31.5}. In 2002, Iran claimed to have conducted a successful test of the Shahab-3, but US intelligence sources claimed that the test was a failure {706e4MNP02 26.7, 30.8}. Iran said it would not seek to extend the range of the Shahab-3 {706e4MNP02 8.9}. In July 2003 Iran conducted another successful test of the Shahab 3 and would begin to introduce the missile into service with the Revolutionary Guard {706e4MNP03 7.7, 21.7}. Iran declared it would abandon development of the Shahab 4 missile to instead upgrade the range of the Shahab 3 {706e4MNP03 7.11, 15.12}. In 2004 The Shahab 3 underwent extended range enhancement from 1300 to an estimated 1600-2000 km {706e4MNP04 18.2}. Iran tested variations of the Shahab 3 at least three times in 2004, and later declared the missile capable of mass production {706e4MNP04 11.8, 20.10, 9.11}

In May 2003, the USA sanctioned the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, an Iranian producer of medium and long-range missiles, as well as two Moldovan firms and a Chinese corporation for their contribution to the missile program of Iran {706e4MNP03 9.5}. Iranian nuclear experts visited North Korea in June 2003. In September 2003 Iran failed to comply with the IAEA’s ultimatum requiring that it come clean about its nuclear-weapon related activities, and the same month IAEA inspectors found traces of highly-enriched uranium at an electrical plant outside Tehran {706e4MNP03 23.9, 26.9}. At the end of 2003, claiming that its nuclear program was solely for peaceful purposes, Iran agreed to sign the additional NPT protocol that allows the IAEA to conduct short-notice weapons inspections at facilities not previously identified as nuclear-related sites {706e4MNP03 21.12}. The AQ Khan nuclear technology ring was reportedly providing Iran with weapons information {29.11}. Iran further dismissed allegations that it is cooperating with North Korea by providing test sites for its long-range missiles in turn for technology {24.7, 8.9}.

Iraq. Following the Gulf War, the United Nations banned Iraq’s possession of ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers. In 1994, Iraq provided detailed information to UNSCOM on its past missile program. Ballistic missile monitoring teams tagged more than 1300 missiles and installed more than 50 cameras as part of UNSCOM’s long-term monitoring program. By 1997, UNSCOM had accounted for all but two of the missiles in Iraq’s possession prior to the Gulf War; but the location of missile components and degree of destruction of Iraq’s indigenous missile manufacturing capacity remained unclear. In April 1998, UNSCOM reported that despite significant progress, it was unable to confirm that Iraq had fulfilled its missile-related commitments to the UN {box 30.4.98}. In December 1998, US and British air strikes on Iraq targeted Iraq’s missile facilities. Iraq was later reported to have rebuilt some of the facilities damaged in these attacks {box 1.9.99}. Throughout 1999, 2000, and 2001, UNSCOM and its successor UNMOVIC were unable to conduct inspections of Iraq’s missile program. Inspections resumed in late 2002 and Iraq submitted a new declaration containing new information, which UNMOVIC examined. {706e5MNP02 19.12} On 20 March 2003 the USA launched Operation Iraqi Freedom, invading Iraq with coalition partners and overthrowing the government of Saddam Hussein on the grounds that Iraq had failed to provide convincing evidence to UNMOVIC inspectors that it had fully disarmed and complied with inspection requirements set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1441. The United States established a provisional authority to run Iraq with the support of occupying US military forces. No evidence of a program to develop longer-range missiles was found after the invasion. As Iraq continued in occupation status in 2004, it is ensured that no new missile developments would take place for some years.

Israel possesses the short-range US-produced Lance missile and the medium-range Israeli-produced Jericho I and Jericho II missiles, the latter with an estimated range of 1500 km. Israel has been a vociferous opponent of Iran’s missile program {21.8.97; 2.10.97} and has hinted at a willingness to launch a preemptive strike against Iran’s missile installations {27.10.97}. In 1998, the United States accused Israel of violating the MTCR by exporting US-financed, Israeli-made missile-related components {30.6.98}. Israel has reportedly developed a third generation Jericho missile with a range of 7200 miles {box 1.12.99}. The Israeli navy has reportedly fitted its Dolphin-class submarines with surface-to-surface missiles, which may be a variant of the Jericho I or II {706e6MNP01 1.6}. In 2001, Israel reportedly conducted a test launch of the Jericho II missile. {706e6MNP01 2.7.01} In 2003, Israel stated that if diplomatic efforts failed, it would be ready to consider the option of a military strike to prevent Iran from building a nuclear bomb {706e4MNP03 10.9}. The German government halted the delivery of two Dolphin-class submarines over concerns that Israel would modify the submarines to carry missiles that might be armed with nuclear warheads, as it had with three previous Dolphin imports {706e6MNP03 24.11}. In December 2003, the IAEA asked Israel to publish information on its secret arsenal of nuclear weapons, and to destroy these weapons voluntarily under IAEA supervision {706e6MNP03 16.12}. In 2004, Israel acknowledged its first ground launched SSCM, the 250 km Delilah-GL, developed by IMI {706e6MNP04 16.6}. Later in the year, Israel held talks with India about possible joint production of a long range missiles {706e6MNP04 31.8}.

Libya tried to import missile-related equipment and technology from Europe, the Far East, and former Soviet states in the mid-1990, according to the CIA {20.6.97}. In 2000, reports surfaced concerning clandestine missile-related imports and Chinese assistance for the Libyan missile program {706e6MNP}. In late 2003, however, after lengthy negotiations with the United States, Libya sent a letter to the UN announcing that it would give up its WMD program, follow MTCR guidelines, and permit intrusive on-site inspection to confirm these radical changes in its national security policy {706bMNP03 23.12}. In 2004 Libya hosted an MTCR team to discuss its decision to give up its WMD program {706MNP04 12.2}. Libya decided to convert hundreds of Scud-B missiles into shorter range, defensive weapons {706MNP04 11.4}.

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea tested the 1000 km-range No-Dong 1 in 1993. On 31 August 1998 it test-fired a three-stage rocket which over-flew Japan. The third stage fell into the Pacific an estimated 6000 kms from the launch site. North Korea claimed that it was the test launch of a satellite, the Kwangmyong-Song 1 {box 1.9.98}. In 1998, North Korea appeared set to test-fire a Taep'o-Dong 2 missile. North Korea conducted a missile engine test in 2001 and renamed its Taep'o-Dong missile “Paektusan 1” {706e3MNP01 3.7, 7.9}. In early 2004, North Korea offered to share missile technology with Nigeria, tested long range ballistic missile engines up to three times, and was reportedly developing two new ballistic missile systems for deployment {706e3MNP04 28.1, 6.5, 10.6, 7.7, 4.8}.

In 1998 North Korea exported missile technology or missile components or complete missiles to Iran, Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Pakistan. From 1996, the United States has engaged the DPRK in negotiations to end the North Korean long-range missile program and North Korean missile exports. The effort almost culminated in an agreement in 2000 following high-level US-North Korean contacts {457bNEN, 706e3MNP} although differences still remained over compensation for ending North Korean missile exports {706e3MNP00 4.11}. An agreement was not finalized, however, due to political uncertainties caused by the 2000 US presidential election {5.3.01}. In 2001, responding to conflicting signals from the Bush administration {6–7.3, 6.6. 3.7}, North Korea announced its intention to continue its missile moratorium; but it threatened to end the moratorium if the United States was unwilling to pursue normalization of relations {21.2, 2–3.5, 3.6.01, 706e3MNP01 4.8}. The United States imposed sanctions on a North Korean entity for missile exports to Iran {706e3 MNP01 27.6}. At a summit with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi in 2002, North Korea agreed to maintain its missile test moratorium {17.9}. A North Korean shipment of Scud missiles to Yemen was intercepted in late 2002 by the United States, but allowed to proceed because the shipment did not violate international law {706e6MNP02 9.12}. In April–June 2003, North Korea reportedly shipped disassembled No-Dong missiles in containers to Iran in Iranian IL-76 cargo planes. In March, the USA sanctioned DPRK’s Changgwang Sinyong Corporation for its involvement in exports of missile technology; and in July the USA extended that sanction to March 2007 {706e6MNP03 31.3, 26.7}. In July 2003 North Korea completed reconstruction of a testing facility for the Taepo-Dong-2 that exploded in 2001. In early 2003 North Korea made many threats to the USA ranging in declarations that if the US did not take steps to improve relations they would end the missile test moratorium, to declaring the ability to hit US targets anywhere in the world in self-defense {706e6MNP03 11.1, 13.2}. In May, a former North Korean missile scientist who defected to the USA stated in testimony to the US Senate that 90 percent of the components of the DPRK missile program came from Japan by sea {706e6MNP03 20.5}. In June USA State Department officials stated that North Korea’s sales of ballistic missile technology were among their three largest sources of hard currency {706e6MNP03 4.6}. In response to DPRK missile proliferation, the Bush Administration launched the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a joint agreement adopted to allow the US and its 11 allied nations to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and seize illegal weapons or missile technologies. North Korea warned that such an interdiction was considered an act of war {706e6MNP03 10.7}. In October 2004, North Korea claimed it was being threatened by the PSI exercises off the Tokyo Bay {706e3MNP04 25-26.10}. In 2004, the moratorium on missile test launches was renewed with Japan {706e3MNP04 22.5}. The US speculated that North Korea was getting around the moratorium by cooperating on ballistic missile development with Iran, who tested missiles for them {706e3MNP04 24.7}.

Pakistan reportedly received complete M-11 missiles from China in 1992, followed by shipments of missile components. Pakistan also built a plant to manufacture M-11 missiles with Chinese aid. Pakistan tested the Haft III missile with a range of 600 km and a payload of 250 kg {box 1.6.97}. Pakistan test-fired the Ghauri I (Haft V), which has range of 100 km and a payload of 700 kg, on 6 April 1998. US sources indicated that the missile had come from North Korea, not China {box 30.4.98; box 30.6.98}. In 1999, Pakistan tested the Ghauri II (an extended-range Ghauri I) and the solid-fueled Shaheen I {box 1.4.99}. By 2000 the Shaheen II was reportedly ready for testing {706e2MNP00 16.9, 20.9}. In 2001, Pakistan developed the new 300 km-range Haider I missile and began serial production of Shaheen I and II missiles {706e2MNP01 4.1, 25.1}. Pakistan conducted several missile tests in 2002 {706e2MNP02 25-28.5, 4.10} and announced the start of serial production of the Ghauri missile. {706e2MNP02 8.11} In early 2003 the Ghauri missile entered service with Pakistan’s armed forces and the 750-km range nuclear-armed Shaheen-I (Haft-VI) was deployed with a new Strategic Force Command {706e2MNP03 8.2, 6.3}. In October 2003 Pakistan successfully test-fired a 290-km Haft-III missile, and two 700-km Haft-IV (Shaheen I) missiles. In 2004, the 2000 km Haft-VI (Shaheen II), three 1500 km Haft-V (Ghauri), the 600-700 km Haft-IV and the 290 km Haft-III (Ghazani) missiles were successfully tested {706e2MNP04 9.3, 29.5, 4.6, 12.10}. The first test prompted the US to urge the nation to exercise restraint in its missile program, resulting in Musharraf snubbing the comment {706e2MNP04 10.3, 1.7}. The Haft-III (Ghaznavi) was designated ready for service {706e2MNP04 11.3}. Pakistan and India agreed to mutually inform each other in advance of missile tests to boost confidence {706e2MNP04 19-20.6}.

In March 2003, the USA imposed economic sanctions against Pakistan’s Khan Research Laboratories for their 2001 import of North Korean missiles. A month later newspapers were reporting that Pakistan had received some 10 Scud-B missiles from North Korea on a Pakistani-flagged freighter observed by US spy satellites {706e2MNP03 2.4}. In early 2004, AQ Khan admitted to proliferating nuclear technology, and received a pardon from President Musharraf. Numerous countries expressed concern about the leakage of nuclear missile technologies to third countries {706e2MNP04 8.2}.

Russia wanted to join the MTCR in 1993, but failed to meet the necessary conditions {25.1}. In June 1993, the United States imposed limited sanctions over a Russian deal to transfer cryogenic rocket engine technology to India. Russia agreed to cancel most of the deal and gave assurances that it would follow MTCR guidelines in return for a large space cooperation program with the United States. Russia joined the MTCR in 1995.

Russian companies continued to sell missile-related technologies to both China and Brazil {27.9.94; 10.6.95; 21.5.96}, however, and were suspected of selling missile guidance components to Iraq {1.3.96}. Russian production and research centers were reportedly helping Iran develop extended-range versions of the Scud missile. This prompted strong US and Israeli protests in 1997 and 1998. In 1998, the United States and Russia discussed missile proliferation issues {21.4} and set up a joint commission of experts to monitor missile-related exports {11.3}. Russia announced new controls on missile-related exports {13.5} and began investigation of nine companies suspected of aiding Iran {15.7}. In 1999, Russia again tightened its missile technology export controls {5.1}, but the United States imposed sanctions on three Russian companies for their failure to halt missile-related exports to Iran {12.1}. The sanctions were lifted in 2000 {25.4}, but US-Russian differences over Iran persisted. {706bMNP02 18-19.2} In 2004 at least one Russian firm was sanctioned by the USA for selling weapons or missile technology to Iran {27.9}.

In 1999, Russian President Boris Yeltsin proposed a global monitoring system for ballistic missiles {20.6}, and Russia held international conferences to explore and promote this proposal {16.3.00, 15.2.01}.

In 2003 the Russian Ship-Building Agency set new priorities that included the design of new strategic submarines and construction of fourth-generation nuclear submarines {615e2NUC03 9.1}. In 2003, the Strategic Missile Troops conducted a test launch of the Topol ICBM {615e2NUC03 27.3}. In 2004, Russia held some 13 missiles launches under a military training exercise deemed “Mobility 2004” {706bMNP04 29.6}. A new long range air-to-air cruise missile, H-555, was added to Russia’s arsenal {706bMNP04 12.1}. The missile exercises got off to a poor start when the years first missiles, two SLBMs, failed to launch while President Putin observed the demonstration, prompting suspicion about the competency of Russia’s arsenal and a public order by Putin to repeat the tests. A month later two SS-N-23 (Sineva)s were successfully launched {706bMNP04 17.2, 17.3}. The missile exercises also included a three prong single day coordinated launch schedule of a 7000 km RSM-54 SLBM, a 2000 km cruise missile from a Tu-95-MS, and an RS-20 (SS-18 Satan) {706bMNP04 29.6}. Further tests included a mobile launched Topol-M ICBM, an RS-18 (SS-19) ICBM, and R-29M (SS-N-23) SLBM and a R-29R (SS-N-18) SLBM in a single day {706bMNP04 20.4, 11.8, 8.9, 2.11}. A SS-25 (Topol) was launched from a mobile launcher and a SLBM RS-29R (SS-N-18) was tested on the same day as well {706bMNP04 2.11}. At the end of the year, within a day of separation, Russia tested a 6000 km SS-18 (Mod 44) and then launched a SS-27 (Topol-M), which led to the missiles being placed in full combat service {706bMNP04 22.12, 24.12}.

South Africa. Although unwilling to become a full member of MTCR, South Africa wanted to join the club in some capacity {11.10.91}. It failed to do so in 1992 {15.2}. In 1991, the United States imposed a three-year ban on trade with the South African firm of Armscor due to its missile technology transfers {11.10.91; box 30.4.92}. The United States and South Africa signed a missile non-proliferation agreement in 1994 {3.10}. South Africa joined the MTCR in 1995. {10–12.10}

South Korea is prohibited by its agreement with the United States from developing missiles with a range greater than 180 kilometers. It unsuccessfully sought relaxation of this agreement while negotiating with the United States on MTCR membership. Following years of negotiation, in 2000, the United States agreed to let South Korea develop missile at the edge of MTCR limits (300 km-range with a payload of 500 kg) {16.10.00; 11.1.01}. South Korea joined the MTCR in 2001, and is scheduled to chair the regime in 2004. {26.3}

Syria reportedly possesses 60 Scud-Cs and 200 Scud-Bs, and might have armed some of them with chemical warheads. In 1997, it received an unknown number of M-9 missiles from China {box 15.9}. Israeli sources claimed that Syria was developing a Scud missile upgrade with a range covering the whole of Israel {box 1.12.99}, and that it had tested a 700 km range Scud-D missile in 2000. {706e6MNP00 25.9}

Taiwan was reported to have the capability to develop a missile that could hit mainland China {box 16.9.96; 706e6MNP00 7.6}. The guidance system for its Tien Chi missile was reportedly under development {box 1.6.97}. Opinion in Taiwan was moving towards the development of an offensive missile capability to deter China {box 1.4.99; box 1.12.99}. Taiwan is reportedly developing a 620 mile-range ballistic missile. {706e6MNP01 11.12}

Ukraine has been negotiating with the United States for admission to the MTCR. Disagreements persisted over Ukraine’s demand to be allowed to develop non-nuclear missiles permitted under the original MTCR guidelines. In 1998, the United States offered to support Ukraine’s MTCR membership in return for the cancellation of the Ukrainian contract to supply turbines to Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant {6.3.98}. Ukraine was admitted to the MTCR in 1998 {5–9.10.98}. The United States reportedly permited it to retain its Scud missiles, in return to not to build or deploy new missiles {1.11.99}. In 2004, Ukraine joined the ICOC {31.3}.

United States. In 2004, a Titan 4 rocket sent another LB Defense support program satellite, to become part of the network established a decade ago that senses the heat generated when a ballistic missile launches {706MNP04 15.2} The Pentagon has considered retaining 500 Minuteman 3 missiles to counter Russia. While the MX Peacekeeper is supposed to be disassembled in September 2005, the Air Force Space Command planned to review a Defense Science Board proposal of redeploying MX missiles armed with conventional warheads {706MNP04 23.3.04, 7.5}. In December 2004 President Bush de-activated the first MX ICBM facility {706MNP04 8.12}. The US launched the three Minuteman 3 missiles and a MX Peacekeeper all 4200 km successfully to the Kwajalen Missile Range {706MNP04 23.6, 21.7, 23.7, 15.9}. The DOD contracted Northrop-Grumman to maintain current propulsion ICBM capabilities {706MNP04 21.12}.

In September 2004, the USA sanctioned 14 foreign individuals and firms worldwide for selling missile or WMD technology and equipment to Iran under the Iran Nonproliferation Act 2000 {706e4MNP04 29.9}. In response to DPRK missile proliferation, the Bush Administration launched the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a joint agreement adopted to allow the US and 11 allied nations to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and seize illegal weapons or missile technologies. In October, the US led the first PSI drill in Asia, the 13th overall {706MNP04 26.10}.

 

 


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